

**Emancipative Values and  
Democracy: Is a Desire for  
Freedom a Cause or an Effect of  
Democracy?**

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## **Abstract**

While past research has demonstrated a strong relationship between citizens' desire for freedom, referred to as citizens' emancipative values, and a states' level of democracy, the reasoning behind this relationship remains unclear. Scholars typically explain the correlation between emancipative values and levels of democracy by arguing that citizens' emancipative values influence states' probability of democratizing; democracy develops after citizens have acquired a strong desire for freedom. An alternative theory argues that citizens' emancipative values develop after democracy has become institutionalized within a society. Thus, a desire freedom develops as a result of democracy. Unlike past research, this study explores both theories while attempting to explain the correlation between democracy and citizens' desire for freedom.

## **Introduction**

For the past half century, social scientists have explored the link between citizens' values and political regimes. Recent work in political culture has focused on the relationship between democracy and citizens' values, specifically citizens' freedom seeking values, referred to as emancipative values. Studies have identified a strong correlation between states' democracy status and their citizens' emancipative values. Citizens in strong democracies generally have high average emancipative values, while citizens in authoritarian states have low average emancipative values. Although emancipative values and democracy are strongly correlated, scholars have yet to determine the cause of this correlation.

Political scientists frequently explain the connection between citizens' emancipative values and a state's democracy status by arguing that emancipative values play a critical role in leading countries to develop democracy. As countries modernize and citizens become wealthier and more educated, citizens' values shift to prioritize freedom (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2008, 2010). As citizens increase their desire for freedom, they become more politically active. This increase in political activity creates pressure on elites and leads democracy to develop and eventually consolidate. As a result, states with higher average emancipative values tend to develop democracy and maintain higher levels of democracy.

Alternatively, living in a democratic regime may influence citizens' values, leading citizens in democratic states to hold higher emancipative values than citizens in authoritarian states. According to this argument, democratization begins by forces

unrelated to the general public's values; yet, once democracy is in place, citizens begin to internalize the norms, values, and behaviors associated with a strong democracy. Thus, emancipative values are a result of democracy rather than a cause.

While less intuitive, the second explanation is more historically grounded than the first. The United States has maintained a democracy since its founding. Despite this, issues of racial, gender, and marriage equality went unaddressed until the twentieth century. While these issues are salient in American society today, few would argue that equality and support for reproductive rights drove the United States to democratize. Rather, these values likely developed after democracy and its corresponding values became institutionalized within American society. As emancipative values include citizens' support for equality and reproductive rights, studying the United States provides one example which leads to questions surrounding the validity of the claim that emancipative values influence democratization

This paper addresses two influential questions in the field. First, it examines the impact of emancipative values on democratization. Second, it tests if living in a democracy influences citizens' emancipative values. While either of these theories may be false, it is also possible that both claims are valid. Citizens' emancipative values may influence democratization and democracy may also influence citizens' values.

Emulating past research, this study finds a strong positive relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy; however, after controlling for the impact of democracy on citizens' values, this research finds little evidence supporting the claim that emancipative values cause democratization. A state's emancipative values prior to

democratization have no bearing on the states probability of developing democracy. In addition, the number of years a citizen has lived in a democratic regime does not influence a citizen's emancipative values.

## **Literature Review**

Liberal democracy is a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to the eighteenth century, electing leaders through free, fair, and open elections designed to represent the general public's will was almost non-existent, restraining executive power was uncommon, and governmental institutions protecting human rights were rare. Following the rise of the United States, these core democratic principles began to spread. Understanding the factors that lead to democratic institutions and democratic consolidation is a fundamental question in political science. From the outset of democratization studies, political scientists have attempted to determine if culture influences the democratization process.

The impact of political attitudes on democratic outcomes has a deep seated history in the political culture literature. To explain the period of democratic collapse that defined the early twentieth century, research in the 1950s and 60s focused on cultural prerequisites for democracy, referring to the values or practices that must be in place prior to democracy developing and deepening (Griffith et al 1956). A plethora of research has revolved around the theory that citizens' values, attitudes, and behaviors influence democratic institutions and performances; however, the field lacks a consensus around which values or attitudes influence democracy and scholars continue to debate how political behaviors or attitudes affect democratic institutions.

Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal work emphasized the importance of citizens' attitudes toward political life as a prerequisite for stable democracies, often referred to as political culture. Almond and Verba (1963, ch.1) found that citizens in stable democracies were more knowledgeable about their government, prideful in their government's institutions, and more politically confident. This set of attitudes, referred to as civic culture, allows citizens to confidently engage in political activities, thereby increasing their likelihood of being politically engaged. The increase in political activity resulted in participant cultures witnessed in the United States and Britain. In contrast, states with subject or parochial cultures, such as Germany, Italy, and Mexico, failed to develop stable democracies.

Civic culture leads to democratic stability by producing an environment that promotes democratic engagement. Highly engaged citizens, such as those present in participant cultures, are more likely to hold their government and representatives accountable by voting or protesting. This accountability leads to more restrained and responsive executives who are more likely to heed the public's will. As a result, democracy tends to thrive in participant cultures.

Almond and Verba's (1963) work helped develop the democratic legitimacy argument, which claims that for democracy to consolidate, democracy must become deeply internalized in social, institutional, and psychological life. Democratic regimes must be viewed as the only viable form of government (Linz and Stepan 1996). In other words, democracy must become "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996).

As the democratic legitimacy argument developed, scholars began measuring democratic legitimacy as citizen's outright support for democracy. Citizens claiming to strongly support democratic regimes are believed to hold high levels of democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy exists on two different levels – in theory and in practice. That is to say, do citizens support the idea of democracy, or do citizens support democracy as it operates within their country (Linde and Ekman 2003). Citizens can support democratic regimes in theory while criticizing democratic institutions in practice. Qi and Shin (2011) refer to this group of citizens as critical democrats and argue that they are essential for states to develop effective democracies. Critical democrats place pressure on the system to improve and pursue democratic reforms, while using democratic processes to achieve their goals. This theory contradicts other research in the field by arguing that critical democrats are more influential in the democratization process than citizens' support for democracy or their democratic values (Qi and Shin 2011).

High democratic legitimacy is argued to influence democratic stability and consolidation by encouraging mass political dissatisfaction be addressed through appropriate democratic channels, such as voting, rather than unconstitutional methods, such as coups and revolutions (Fails and Pierce 2010, Diamond 1999 ch.5). Citizens who support democratic regimes in theory are less likely to subvert the democratic process when pursuing reforms. Diamond (1999 ch.5) also argues that democracy levels rise or fall to meet citizens' demands for democracy, implying that in states where citizens hold high levels of democratic support, democracy will eventually develop and stabilize.

Despite several studies supporting the democratic legitimacy theory, Fails and Pierce (2010) find no relationship between democratic legitimacy and levels of democracy. In addition, they find no relationship between support for democratic regimes and democratic consolidation or collapse (Fails and Pierce 2010). Their results likely reveal that most citizens around the world today support the idea of democracy, regardless of the intuitions practicing in their country. Their work may also demonstrate the success of many authoritarian regimes in suppressing mass demands for more democratic institutions.

Scholars typically agree that citizens' attitudes and values influence democratic outcomes; however, which attitudes are influential is still heavily debated in the field. While the civic culture argument stresses citizens' attitudes towards democracy, a competing theory states that bonds between citizens influence democratic performance. Putnam's research differs from past work by focusing on the importance of social capital, which develops through civic associations and "includes the networks, associations, and shared habits that enable individuals to act collectively" (Warren 1999, 9). In areas with high social capital, citizens expect each other to obey the law, fulfill their promises, and act justly, while areas with low social capital lack similar expectations. In addition, high social capital helps build reciprocal societies and increase collaboration, which are essential for prospering democracies (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 2014 ch.7).

In a study comparing Italian regions, Putnam (1995) discovered regions with high social capital, defined by high levels of interpersonal trust, participation in social activities, and personal integrity, also had effective governments that achieved economic prosperity. Following Putnam's work, strong interpersonal trust is regularly regarded as a prerequisite

for an effective democracy. Engagement in civic activities helps build trust between strangers; as a result, more engaged citizens generally hold higher levels of trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Gibson (1998) supports Putnam's theory by demonstrating that Russian citizens hold low levels of interpersonal trust and political tolerance, which contributes to the country's inability to develop democracy. Warren (1999, 9-12) also finds that generalized trust, trust directed towards strangers, is necessary for democracy to function, while particular trust, trust limited to one's family or group, often hampers democratic development. Particular trust often fortifies group bonds which can increase fractionalization and decrease compromise between groups. In contrast, generalized trust helps build complex social networks and fosters collaboration between groups and individuals (Warren 1999, 9-12).

Contradicting the theory, Seligson (2002) finds no relationship between interpersonal trust and preference for democracy. His research also reveals no connection between trust and political participation. At the national level, after controlling for GNP, he did not find a significant relationship between preference for democracy and interpersonal trust.

Tolerance for opposing views is generally argued to develop alongside interpersonal trust through civic associations. Similar to trust, tolerance allows democratic negotiations to take place (Gibson 1998, Inglehart 2003). Without tolerance for opposing views, legitimate party competition, which is prevalent in all strong democracies, can never occur (Gibson 1998, Inglehart 2003). However, several scholars have found that while Americans support tolerance for outsiders in theory, they have very low levels of tolerance

when applied to specific groups (Prothro and Grigg 1960, Sulliver et al 1982, Stouffer 1955). Although a single case does not provide enough evidence to dismiss the theory, low tolerance in one of the strongest democracies in the world may demonstrate that tolerance has little impact on democratic performance. Alternatively, the amount of tolerance needed for a state to develop and sustain democracy may be much lower than typically believed.

#### Emancipative Values' Effect on Democracy

While several scholars focus on the impact of citizen's values or attitudes on democratic stability or performance, an alternative approach explores citizens' values as a casual factor influencing democratization. Thus, values not only determine democratic stability and performance, they also influence a state's probability of developing democracy. Values effect democratization by impacting citizens' behaviors, which influences citizens' levels of political engagement. When a sufficient number of citizens hold values supporting political activity, the country will experience an increase in political action. The increase in political engagement creates pressure on elites and eventually leads to democratization.

Values encouraging political engagement are argued to develop as states modernize (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). The human empowerment sequence, or human development, claims that as societies develop, citizens become wealthier and more educated. As a result, citizens no longer focus on fulfilling their basic needs. This provides them with more time and energy, increasing their desire for freedom and individualism. This shift in values, from traditional to secular and survival to self-expression, alters people's behavior, making them

more likely to engage in activities that develop and build support for civic culture. As civic culture increases, citizens are more likely to engage in protest activities and demand an increase in their civil liberties. This creates pressure on elites, who can either ignore mass demands and risk a revolution, or concede and develop more robust civil liberties - a feature of democracy. Therefore, modernization leads to democracy by changing citizens' values, making citizens more likely to engage in political activities, which increases a state's chance of democratizing.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2008, 2010) are the leading scholars proposing that citizens' values influence democratization. In their work, the scholars emphasize freedom seeking values, which they originally label "self-expression values" and later repackage as "emancipative values." This idea is closely connected to Griffith et al.'s (1956) research, which claims that for democracy to develop, citizens must hold a particular set of universal values, including a desire for liberty, equality, and individualism. Inglehart and Welzel argue that without a desire to increase freedom, democratization is unlikely to occur.

In their early research, Inglehart (1990) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2008) argue that self-expression values are strongly connected to a country's level of democracy and its probability of democratizing. They find a strong correlation ( $r=0.83$ ) between self-expression values and political institutions; countries with higher self-expression values are more likely to have strong democracies (Inglehart 2003). Democracy levels also shift to match the country's values. While examining nations over time, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) find that as self-expression values increase, states tend to become more democratic; as self-expression values decrease, states generally become less democratic. In addition,

self-expression scores can explain about 69% of the democratic variance between countries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Despite the strong correlation, the study produces few insights due to the fatal flaws in self-expression values. While self-expression values are defined as capturing citizens' freedom seeking values, the components comprising self-expression values fail to match the definition. Self-expression values include several unrelated characteristics about an individual, including a respondent's level of happiness, level of trust, level of political engagement, and support for homosexuality. Many of these components, such as trust and happiness, have little to do with citizens support for freedom. Furthermore, including a citizen's level of political engagement is tautological as political activity is argued to be a result of high self-expression values. In addition, self-expression values' individual components are not correlated with each other; thus, they cannot accurately measure citizens desire for freedom (Jackman and Miller 1996, Seilgson 2002, Hadenius and Toerell 2005). When conducting Inglehart's (1990) study with each component separately, Jackman and Miller (1996) fail to find any meaningful relationship between self-expression values and levels of democracy.

Attempting to correct for these deficiencies, Welzel (2013) transitions from self-expression values to emancipative values. Similar to self-expression values, emancipative values are intended to capture the importance citizens place on freedom. Emancipative values are comprised of four distinct subcategories: voice, autonomy, choice, and equality. *Voice* focuses on how strongly individuals believe citizens should have a say in their society, emphasizing freedom of speech. *Autonomy* measures the importance people place

on controlling their own lives. *Choice* captures how much citizens value freedom over their personal lives. Each of these components specifically address the priority citizens place on freedom, demonstrated by the moderate correlation between subcategories, shown later in this paper. Consequently, emancipative values are a stronger indicator of citizens' desire for freedom than self-expression values; thus, this paper's analysis utilizes emancipative values.

### Democracy's Effect on Emancipative Values

While many scholars have focused on citizens' values and attitudes as a prerequisite for democracy, significantly fewer have studied the impact of democracy on citizens' values. Distinguishing the causal relationship between values and democracy may be difficult as democracy and culture are dependent on each other. While democracy relies on a specific culture to thrive, democratic regimes influence citizens' values by creating institutionalized behaviors (Elkins and Simeon 1979, Rustow 1970). Living under a democratic regime likely influences citizens' values by prioritizing specific norms and behaviors. According to the 'institutional learning theory,' the institutions a country adopts strongly influence citizens' behaviors, preferences, and values (Dahlum and Knutsen 2016). Democracy institutionalizes freedom ideals by providing citizens ample opportunities to exercise their freedoms and relying on citizens to employ these freedoms. High levels of freedom are witnessed in mundane activities, such as reading an article critical of the government, to rarer events, such as voting. Additionally, democracies rely on citizen participation in elections and understanding the necessity of voting reiterates the importance of freedom in society. Democracies regularly allow and encourage citizens to

exercise their right to freedom. Repeatedly engaging in these behaviors and norms establishes the importance of freedom in an individual's life and overtime citizens internalize these values. In contrast, authoritarian regimes lack these opportunities; as a result, transitioning to democracy likely increases citizens' desire for freedom. This implies that living under a democratic regime increases citizens' emancipative values.

In the late nineteenth century, De Tocqueville (1889) explored the relationship between political attitudes and democratic performance, ultimately claiming that America's democracy influenced citizens' attitudes, which encouraged American citizens to support equality and build civic associations. De Tocqueville demonstrated that citizens' attitudes and behaviors were derived from government institutions.

In a similar but distinct theory, Rustow (1970) argues that citizens acquire democratic values overtime as democracy develops and strengthens within society. In the habituation phase of democracy, democratic values are entrenched within society; however, this phase can only occur after elites have begun the democratization process. Democratization relies on elites deciding to institutionalize some aspect of democracy. After the democratization process has begun, the masses slowly acquire democratic principles as they live under a democratic regime. Consequently, democracy influences citizens' values.

Recognizing that living in a democracy influences citizens desire for freedom illuminates a major flaw in Inglehart and Welzel's work. As argued by Dahlum and Knutsen (2016) and Muller and Seligson (1994), Inglehart and Welzel fail to determine if citizens' values cause democratization or if emancipative values are produced by living in

a democracy. In their research, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) include countries that have been democratic for decades while using values from recent years. For example, their study includes the United States and Britain. Both states have been democratic since the early 1900s; yet, the countries' emancipative values are measured after 1981, the first year of the World Value Survey. Including values measured after a state democratized makes it impossible to determine if citizens' values developed as a result of democracy or if their values influenced the democratization process. Inglehart and Welzel cannot claim emancipative values influence democratization when many of their values are taken after states acquired democracy.

Dahlum and Knutsen (2016) and Muller and Seligson (1994) attempt to improve upon Inglehart and Welzel's research by controlling for democracy's effect on emancipative values; they find that self-expression values have no impact on democratization. However, both scholars explore the relationship between democratization and self-expression values rather than emancipative values. Although both self-expression values and emancipative values emphasize freedom seeking activities, as previously noted, self-expression values are a weaker indicator of the priority citizens place on freedom. Scholars have yet to determine causality in the relationship between emancipative values and democratization. This study attempts to fill this knowledge gap by improving upon Dahlum and Knutsen (2016) and Muller and Seligson's (1994) work and utilizing emancipative values.

The literature reveals a strong and well established correlation between citizens' civic attitudes and a state's democracy status. Citizens in strong democracies typically have

participant political cultures and high levels of social capital. Recent work has shifted away from citizens' civic attitudes and begun studying the relationship between democracy and citizens' freedom seeking values, referred to as emancipative values. Studies demonstrate a strong correlation between democracy status and emancipative values, with strong democracies holding higher average emancipative values than weak democracies. Attempting to explain this relationship leads to three alternative theories.

**H<sub>1</sub>:** Emancipative values influence democratization; states with higher emancipative values are more likely to develop democracy than states with lower emancipative values.




According to the human empowerment sequence, emancipative values influence a state's probability of developing and maintaining a stable democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Welzel 2013). As states modernize, citizens place increasing importance on freedom and individualism, making citizens more likely to engage in activities that promote freedom. Consequently, citizens' emancipative values increase. Citizens with higher emancipative values are more likely to engage in political action, such as protesting or rebelling. These actions increase pressure on elites and lead to democratic transitions. As a result, states with higher emancipative values are more likely to democratize (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2008, 2010; Welzel 2013).

For the human empowerment sequence to be accurate, states with higher average emancipative values will have stronger democracies than states with lower average emancipative values after controlling for modernization. In addition, a state's emancipative

values should impact its probability of developing democracy. States with higher emancipative values will be more likely to develop democracy than states with lower emancipative values after controlling for outside factors.

**H<sub>2</sub>:** Living in a democratic state increases citizens' emancipative values.




As outlined above, past research provides reasons to suspect reverse causality of the human empowerment sequence. Democracies regularly require citizens to exercise their freedoms. In a democracy, citizens are called upon to vote in elections, participate in campaigns, criticize the government, and engage in peaceful protests. When these norms and behaviors are instilled in society, citizens begin to value and expect high levels of freedom. As a result, living under a democratic regime produces an increase in emancipative values.

Rather than emancipative values influencing democracy, it is more likely that democracy influences emancipative values. According to this theory, democracy develops and stabilizes for reasons unrelated to citizens' values, such as coups. As citizens live under democratic regimes they begin prioritizing freedom and individualism, common and frequently repeated ideas in democratic regimes. If emancipative values develop under democracy, states should experience an increase in emancipative values after transitioning to democracy and controlling for outside variables.

Alternatively, hypothesis one and hypothesis two may both be valid. Under this scenario, high emancipative values lead states to democratize; once democracy is

established, emancipative values increase as democratic norms become institutionalized in the society. This theory is only plausible if hypothesis one and two are correct. If either hypothesis fails, then the relationship between democracy and emancipative values is not multidirectional.



### **Data and Measurements**

Following Polity and Freedom House's definition, a democratic state is defined as including the following: allows citizens to replace their leaders through regularly scheduled, free, and fair elections; does not regulate or restrain political competition or opposition; and has institutional constraints in place to limit the executive's power, creating horizontal accountability. The extent to which these requirements are met determines a state's level of democracy, with high levels of democracy referring to states that fulfill many or all democratic requirements and low levels of democracy referring to states that meet very few or no democratic requirements. The terms *democracy* and *democratic* are referring to states with high levels of democracy, while *authoritarianism* and *autocratic* are referring to states with low levels of democracy. Similarly, strong democracies fulfill many or all democratic requirements, while weak democracies fulfill few or no democratic requirements. A full or complete democracy is a state that fulfills all democratic requirements.

A nation's level of democracy is captured by Freedom House's aggregate democracy score. The score ranges from 1 to 100, with one-hundred being the most democratic and one the least. Democracy levels are from 2014 to correspond with the most recent wave of the World Value Survey (2010-2014). When dichotomously classifying states as democratic or authoritarian, states with Polity scores of eight or above are considered democratic. In hypothesis two, years under democracy is calculated as the number of years a state has held a polity score of eight or above. States that developed democracy before 1914 are coded as having a democracy for 100 years.

Emancipative values are derived from the World Value Survey (WVS). Hypothesis one relies on emancipative values from wave six (2010-2014), the most recent wave of WVS. Wave six contains fifty-nine countries from every continent except Antarctica and includes a wide selection of developed, developing, and undeveloped nations. In addition, the sample includes only seven stable western democracies. Therefore, wave six of the World Value Survey is likely generalizable.<sup>1</sup>

Hypothesis two utilizes emancipative values from wave three (1994-1998) of the WVS, which includes fifty-two countries spanning six continents. Removing mature democracies decreases the sample size to thirty-nine. Although this is a smaller sample size than wave six, it still represents about a quarter of the world's countries and includes a variety of industrialized, industrializing, and unindustrialized nations. Therefore, the results likely remain generalizable. The appendix provides a list of countries in each wave,

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<sup>1</sup> As is a problem in all survey and sampling data, it is impossible to determine if the sample is completely representative of the population.

their emancipative values, and whether each country is classified as a mature (old) democracy.

The sample also includes a variety of different regime transitions. Twenty-three countries were democratic in 1994 and remained democratic in 2014, seventeen were authoritarian in 1994 and developed democracy by 2014, three were democratic in 1994 and reverted to authoritarianism by 2014, and nine were authoritarian in 1994 and remained authoritarian in 2014. This data allows for the comparison of emancipative values across different regime transitions. States that have remained democratic since 1994 should have higher average emancipative values than states that reverted away from democracy or states that have not developed democracy.

The questions comprising emancipative values' subcategories – voice, autonomy, equality, and choice - are identical to those used by Welzel (2013). *Voice* uses factor analysis to combine questions asking respondents to prioritize a list of several different items, including “protecting freedom of speech,” “giving people more say about important government decisions,” and “giving people more say about how things are done in their job and their communities.” *Autonomy's* factor includes whether respondents identified independence and imagination as desirable childhood qualities but not obedience. *Equality's* index uses “education is more important for men than women,” “when jobs are scarce, men should have priority over women to get a job,” and “men make better political leaders.” *Choice* includes how justifiable respondents find “divorce,” “abortion,” and “homosexuality.” To create emancipative values, the four subcategories are factored

together and standardized. A state's average emancipative values are used to perform country level analysis.

Unlike self-expression values, the subcategories comprising emancipative values are moderately correlated, demonstrating that the combined index accurately represents a common underlying theme, citizens' desire for freedom. Table one displays the correlations between each index.

Table 1

| Emancipative Values Subcategory Correlations<br>(2014) |          |       |        |
|--|----------|-------|--------|
|  | Autonomy | Voice | Choice |
| Voice  | 0.21     | --    | --     |
| Choice   | 0.55     | 0.41  | --     |
| Equality   | 0.31     | 0.57  | 0.73   |

A state's level of modernization, resource wealth, and location are used as control variables. Per capita GDP and the percent of school aged children enrolled in primary school are used to capture a state's level of modernization. Both variables are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators in 2014. When the percent of school aged children enrolled in primary school in 2014 is unavailable, the most recent data from earlier years is used. Resource wealth is measured by total resource rents as a percent of GDP and is also taken from the World Development Indicators in 2014. A dummy variable identifying if a country is located in Europe or the Americas is generated to control for the impact of geographical proximity to democratic states. In hypothesis two, a dummy variable indicates if a country was democratic in 1994.

## Method and Results

**H<sub>1</sub>:** Emancipative values influence democratization; states with higher emancipative values are more likely to develop democracy than states with lower emancipative values.

Emancipative values are argued to influence levels of democracy by increasing citizens' desire for freedom, which increases their level of political engagement (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2008, 2010; Welzel 2013). The increase in political activity places pressure on elites and eventually leads to democratization. Therefore, states with higher average emancipative values are more likely to develop democracy.


To test if emancipative values increase the probability of a state democratizing, two methods are used. The first, utilizes correlation analysis and OLS regressions to compare countries' emancipative values from 2014 to countries' democracy scores in 2014. This method emulates Welzel's (2013) approach and reveals if there is a relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy. However, comparing countries' emancipative values in 2014 to levels of democracy in 2014 does not control for the impact of democracy on emancipative values; therefore, it is not able to determine if emancipative values influence the probability of a state democratizing.

Supporting past research, the results reveal a positive relationship between levels of democracy and emancipative values. States with higher levels of democracy tend to have higher emancipative values than states with lower levels of democracy. The relationship remains significant after controlling for outside factors.

Correlation analysis demonstrates a strong relationship between levels of democracy and states' average emancipative values ( $r=0.76$ ). Figure one demonstrates this relationship. There is also a moderate to strong relationship between levels of democracy

and voice, choice, and equality ( $r=0.56$ ,  $r=0.68$ ,  $r=0.71$  respectively). Only autonomy has a weak relationship with levels of democracy ( $r=0.39$ ).

Investigating individual countries further illustrates the relationship between levels of democracy and emancipative values. Iraq, Uzbekistan, and Rwanda have some of the lowest levels of democracy in the world and the countries' average emancipative values are also extremely low. In contrast, the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands have very high levels democracies and also hold high average emancipative values.



Author calculations from WVS and Freedom House

In addition to emancipative values, several other variables are considered influential in determining democratic success. Modernization is often regarded as one of the most well documented factors influencing levels of democracy. More modernized states generally have higher levels of democracy (Lipset 1963, Przeworski 1997, Moore 1967). Natural resource wealth may also influence democratic performance and a state's odds of democratizing (Ross 1999). Regardless of citizens' emancipative values, states

with high resource rents are unlikely to democratize (Ross 1999). Proximity to other democratic states also likely influences democratization and levels of democracy. States located near strong democracies, such as the United States and Western Europe, are more likely to develop stable democracies than countries located further away from democratic strongholds or in close proximity to strong authoritarian regimes.

Regression results, provided below in *Regression 1*, demonstrate that the relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy remains significant after controlling for modernization, resource rents, and geographical impacts ( $p=0.012$ ). In model two and four emancipative values are logged to account for the non-linear relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy. The relationship remains significant regardless if emancipative values are logged. On average, a standard deviation increase in emancipative values corresponds to a thirty-six-point increase in a state's democracy score. To provide a concrete example, if Palestine's average emancipative values increase by one standard deviation, Palestine's democracy status will be equivalent to that of Ukraine. Overall, the results demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy; the relationship remains after controlling for outside factors.

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**Emancipative Values and Levels of Democracy- OLS Regression**


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 Dependent Variable: Level of Democracy (2014)
 

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|                                      | Model 1            | Model 2            | Model 3           | Model 4           |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Emancipative Values<br>(2014)        | 61.23***<br>[6.62] | --                 | 36.31*<br>[13.97] | --                |
| Emancipative Values<br>(Logged)      | --                 | 32.53***<br>[4.32] | --                | 15.03*<br>[7.24]  |
| GDP Per Capita<br>(thousands)        | --                 | --                 | 0.17<br>[0.20]    | 0.35<br>[0.18]    |
| Primary School<br>Enrollment (% Net) | --                 | --                 | 0.02<br>[0.43]    | 0.06<br>[0.44]    |
| Natural Resource Rents<br>(% of GDP) | --                 | --                 | -0.27<br>[0.30]   | -0.27<br>[0.33]   |
| Europe                               | --                 | --                 | 19.30*<br>[9.19]  | 24.51**<br>[8.75] |
| Americas                             | --                 | --                 | 16.89*<br>[8.09]  | 19.71*<br>[8.13]  |
| Constant                             | 60.17<br>[2.38]    | 79.62<br>[3.74]    | 51.22<br>[40.44]  | 52.67<br>[42.91]  |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>              | 0.59               | 0.49               | 0.61              | 0.59              |
| Observations                         | 59                 | 58                 | 53                | 53                |

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
\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001, beta coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

The second approach tests if emancipative values influence states' odds of democratizing by comparing 2014 democracy levels to emancipative values from 1994. In their work, Inglehart and Welzel include countries that democratized before the nations' values were measured. Values measured after a state develops democracy are not accurate predictors of the nation's values prior to democratization. Based on the institutional learning theory, it is likely that citizens' values change as they live under a democratic regime. To prove emancipative values cause democratization, emancipative values need to reflect citizens' values prior to the state democratizing.

To account for this, emancipative values are measured in 1994, rather than 2014. This study also removes any state that developed democracy before 1985, referred to as *mature democracies*. Therefore, all countries included in the analysis are either young democracies or authoritarian states. By only including young democracies, this approach differs drastically from past research. Unlike Inglehart and Welzel's method, excluding mature democracies assures citizens' emancipative values are not effected by living under a democratic regime. While some countries included in the analysis develop democracy a few years prior to their value measurements, due to data availability, it is necessary to assume that countries' average values do not significantly change in less than ten years. In addition, utilizing an earlier wave would drastically shrink the sample size.

Excluding mature democracies allows this study to test if emancipative values in 1994 influence levels of democracy in 2014 by eliminating the impact of democracy on citizens' values. Therefore, this study can examine if emancipative values influence a state's odds of democratizing.

When examining regime transitions, emancipative values appear to influence democratization. This relationship is depicted in figure two. A state's average emancipative values in 1994 appear to impact its regime type in 2014. Stable democracies have higher average emancipative values than any other group. States that transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy have the second highest emancipative values. Stable authoritarian regimes have the lowest average emancipative values. This demonstrates that higher average emancipative values are associated with democratization while lower emancipative values are connected to democratic declines. For example, the United States, a stable democracy, has higher emancipative values than Nigeria, a stable authoritarianism (0.44 and -0.44 respectively). While Mexico, which became democratic in 2000, has higher emancipative values than Venezuela, which transitioned away from democracy c.1999 (-0.01 and -0.09 respectively).



While Figure two appears promising, the results are deceiving. Although the overall sample size is adequate for the purpose of this study, dividing states according to their regime transitions produces a small sample size in each category, inflating the standard errors. Consequently, there is no significant difference between regime transitions and average emancipative values. In addition, Figure two does not control for outside variables.

An OLS regression is performed comparing democracy levels in 2014 to countries' average emancipative values in 1994, while excluding mature democracies and controlling for modernization, resource rents, and geographical effects. A variable controlling for a state's democratization status in 1994 is also included. States that were democratic in 1994 are more likely to remain democratic in 2014 than states that were authoritarian in 1994 and must make the transition to democracy. Thus, when exploring the impact of emancipative values on democratization, it is necessary to control for a state's prior democratization status. Emancipative values are logged to account for the non-linear relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy.

OLS regression results demonstrate that emancipative values likely have no impact on a state's level of democracy. Model one and model four investigate the impact of 1994 emancipative values on levels of democracy in 2014 without controlling for outside factors. Without controlling for other variables, emancipative values in 1994 significantly impact democracy in 2014 ( $p < 0.001$ ). This relationship remains significant after excluding mature democracies ( $p = 0.001$ ). However, after controlling for regional effects, resource rents, modernization, and past democracy status, emancipative values in 1994 do not significantly

impact levels of democracy in 2014 ( $p=0.227$ ). Excluding mature democracies further weakens the effect of emancipative values on democracy ( $p=0.865$ ).

Regression 2

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**Emancipative Values and Democratization - OLS Regression**

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Dependent Variable: Level of Democracy (2014)

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|                                    | All Countries      |                   |                   | Excluding Mature Democracies |                   |                   |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                                    | Model 1            | Model 2           | Model 3           | Model 4                      | Model 5           | Model 6           |
| Emancipative Values (1994)         | 46.26***<br>[7.77] | 15.36<br>[12.51]  | --                | 60.89**<br>[16.22]           | 3.43<br>[20.06]   | --                |
| Emancipative Values (1994, Logged) | --                 | --                | -1.69<br>[1.25]   | --                           | --                | -1.61<br>[1.29]   |
| GDP Per Capita (thousands)         | --                 | 0.20<br>[0.19]    | 0.35**<br>[0.12]  | --                           | 1.11*<br>[0.53]   | 1.09*<br>[0.46]   |
| Primary School Enrollment (% Net)  | --                 | 0.24<br>[0.35]    | 0.82<br>[0.46]    | --                           | 0.01<br>[0.38]    | 0.48<br>[0.50]    |
| Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP)  | --                 | -1.50**<br>[0.47] | -1.74**<br>[0.47] | --                           | -0.16*<br>[0.55]  | -1.63**<br>[0.52] |
| Europe                             | --                 | 12.94*<br>[5.18]  | 16.29**<br>[4.89] | --                           | 21.16**<br>[6.90] | 22.92**<br>[6.04] |
| Americas                           | --                 | 13.87*<br>[6.25]  | 19.61**<br>[5.95] | --                           | 20.10*<br>[8.32]  | 23.59**<br>[6.95] |
| Democracy in 1994                  | --                 | 9.82*<br>[4.71]   | 9.93*<br>[4.69]   | --                           | 3.17<br>[5.56]    | 3.76<br>[5.29]    |
| Constant                           | 72.65<br>[2.50]    | 38.57<br>[32.96]  | -21.15<br>[43.91] | 72.94<br>[3.43]              | 46.98<br>[35.90]  | 0.91<br>47.04     |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>            | 0.40               | 0.65              | 0.66              | 0.26                         | 0.60              | 0.63              |
| Observations                       | 52                 | 46                | 46                | 39                           | 33                | 33                |

\*  $p<0.05$ , \*\*  $p<0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p<0.001$ , beta coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

Past research demonstrates a strong relationship between emancipative values and levels of democracy. However, this study shows the relationship is not causal; emancipative values do not influence levels of democracy nor do they increase the likelihood of a state democratizing.


**H<sub>2</sub>:** Living in a democratic state increases citizens' emancipative values.

Liberal democracies regularly prioritize freedom and individualism. As citizens live under democratic regimes, they begin to adopt these values as their own. As a result, living in a democracy increases citizens' emancipative values. Hypothesis two empirically tests the claim that emancipative values develop over time as citizens live under democratic institutions. This theory proposes that democracy influences emancipative values, rather than the reverse which is argued in hypothesis one. To focus exclusively on the impact of democracy on emancipative values, authoritarian states are excluded from regression analysis.

The number of years a state has been democratic is positively correlated with a state's average emancipative values ( $r=0.29$ ). States that have been democratic for many years tend to have higher average emancipative values than states that have been democratic for fewer years. Although this is only a moderate relationship and does not control for outside variables, it may demonstrate that democracy influences emancipative values.

Examining value change after democratic transitions further supports the hypothesis. Every state with data available for emancipative values before and after transitioning to democracy experienced an increase in emancipative values after

transitioning to democracy, relative to the other states in each wave. While Mexico experienced the largest increase (0.35 standard deviations), the average increase for all countries was 0.21 standard deviations, relative to other countries in each wave. In addition, not a single country experienced a decline in emancipative values, relative to the other countries in each wave, after transitioning to democracy. However, the generalizability of these results is limited due to the small sample size.



An OLS regression is performed comparing the number of years a nation has been democratic to a states' average emancipative values in 2014. Wealth and education are argued to strongly influence citizens' emancipative values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Welzel 2013); therefore, per capita GDP and school enrollment are controls.

Regression results, displayed below in *Regression three*, contradict the hypothesis. Without controlling for outside factors, living in a democratic regime significantly

increases citizens' emancipative values ( $p=0.002$ ). On average, for each year a nation is democratic, a state's average emancipative values increase by 0.01 standard deviations. However, after controlling for a country's wealth and education, democracy does not significantly impact emancipative values ( $p=0.817$ ). While democracy appears to effect emancipative values, the relationship is driven by wealth and education. Per capita GDP and school enrollment both significantly increase emancipative values ( $p<0.001$ ,  $p=0.024$  respectively). In addition, per capita GDP, school enrollment, and the number of years a state has been democratic, explain about 66% of variance between states' average emancipative values, demonstrating that these factors are an accurate predictor of states' average emancipative values.

| <b>Democratic Years and Emancipative Values - OLS Regression</b> |                  |                   |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Dependent Variable: Emancipative Values (2014)                   |                  |                   |
|  | Model 1          | Model 2           |
| Democratic Years   | 0.01**<br>[0.00] | -0.00<br>[0.00]   |
| GDP Per Capita<br>(thousands)                                    | --               | 0.01***<br>[0.00] |
| Primary School<br>Enrollment (% Net)                             | --               | 0.01*<br>[0.01]   |
| Constant   | -0.56<br>[0.09]  | -1.33<br>[0.51]   |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>  | 0.26             | 0.66              |
| Observations   | 32               | 31                |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001, beta coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

## Conclusion

Supporting past research, this study finds a strong correlation between citizens' desire for freedom and levels of democracy. States with higher levels of democracy tend to have higher emancipative values. Scholars typically explain this relationship by arguing that emancipative values influence levels of democracy by increasing citizens' political engagement. Consequently, elites experience mounting pressure from the masses, causing democracy to develop and deepen. However, this study finds no evidence supporting the claim that high emancipative values lead states to democratize. After controlling for

modernization, geographical location, oil wealth, and the impact of democracy on citizens' values, emancipative values do not significantly effect a state's level of democracy.

An alternative theory argues that emancipative values develop overtime after democracy has become institutionalized in a society. Repeatedly engaging in democratic activities causes citizens to prioritize freedom. According to this theory, emancipative values are a result of democratization rather than a cause. However, living in a democratic regime does not significantly affect citizens' values. Rather, emancipative values are influenced by a countries education and wealth.

While there is a strong correlation between emancipative values and democracy, these results show that the relationship is not causal. Democracy does not influence emancipative values and emancipative values do not influence democracy. However, per capita GDP significantly impacts a state's probability of democratizing and significantly impacts citizens' emancipative values. Therefore, wealth can explain the relationship between democracy and emancipative values; regardless of citizens' values, wealth increases the probability of a state democratizing. In addition, wealthier citizens generally have higher emancipative values.

Further research should explore if focusing on different socioeconomic groups (e.g. elites, middle class, lower class) alters results. While this study does not distinguish between social classes, it is possible that only a portion of a country's population needs to hold high emancipative values for democracy to develop. If this is the case, results may differ from those found in this study.

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## Appendix

| Included Countries, Emancipative Values, and Democracy Scores |                     |                 |                |                     |                     |                 |                |
|---|---------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Wave Three  |                     |                 |                | Wave Six            |                     |                 |                |
| Country   | Emancipative Values | Democracy Score | Old Democracy? | Country             | Emancipative Values | Democracy Score | Old Democracy? |
| Nigeria   | -0.56               | 46              | No             | Libya               | -0.51               | 41              | No             |
| India   | -0.40               | 77              | Yes            | Yemen               | -0.50               | 26              | No             |
| El Salvador   | -0.35               | 77              | No             | Ghana               | -0.50               | 84              | No             |
| Pakistan  | -0.35               | 42              | No             | Qatar               | -0.48               | 28              | No             |
| Bangladesh  | -0.34               | 53              | No             | Jordan              | -0.45               | 35              | No             |
| Moldova   | -0.30               | 64              | No             | Iraq                | -0.44               | 25              | No             |
| Colombia  | -0.24               | 62              | No             | Nigeria             | -0.42               | 46              | No             |
| Georgia   | -0.24               | 63              | No             | Pakistan            | -0.39               | 42              | No             |
| Russia  | -0.23               | 26              | No             | Palestine           | -0.37               | 15              | No             |
| Azerbaijan  | -0.23               | 22              | No             | Uzbekistan          | -0.32               | 4               | No             |
| Ukraine   | -0.23               | 55              | No             | Rwanda              | -0.30               | 26              | No             |
| Poland  | -0.21               | 93              | No             | Algeria             | -0.28               | 34              | No             |
| Belarus   | -0.20               | 14              | No             | Kyrgyzstan          | -0.28               | 39              | No             |
| Armenia   | -0.20               | 43              | No             | Armenia             | -0.26               | 43              | No             |
| South Africa  | -0.19               | 81              | No             | Tunisia             | -0.26               | 63              | No             |
| Taiwan  | -0.18               | 88              | No             | Zimbabwe            | -0.23               | 28              | No             |
| Philippines   | -0.18               | 63              | No             | Azerbaijan          | -0.23               | 22              | No             |
| China   | -0.16               | 17              | No             | Kuwait              | -0.22               | 39              | No             |
| Albania   | -0.14               | 67              | No             | Morocco             | -0.22               | 42              | No             |
| South Korea   | -0.12               | 85              | No             | Turkey              | -0.22               | 60              | No             |
| Montenegro  | -0.10               | 72              | No             | Malaysia            | -0.19               | 47              | No             |
| Venezuela   | -0.09               | 38              | No             | Bahrain             | -0.17               | 16              | No             |
| Peru  | -0.06               | 71              | No             | Thailand            | -0.15               | 54              | No             |
| Slovakia  | -0.04               | 91              | No             | Georgia             | -0.13               | 63              | No             |
| Lithuania   | -0.03               | 90              | No             | Kazakhstan          | -0.12               | 25              | No             |
| Serbia  | -0.03               | 78              | No             | Philippines         | -0.10               | 63              | No             |
| Mexico  | -0.01               | 65              | No             | Egypt               | -0.09               | 31              | No             |
| Romania   | 0.00                | 84              | No             | Trinidad and Tobago | -0.08               | 81              | No             |
| Bulgaria  | 0.01                | 78              | No             | Ecuador             | -0.07               | 60              | No             |
| Turkey  | 0.01                | 60              | No             | Lebanon             | -0.04               | 48              | No             |
| Chile   | 0.01                | 95              | No             | Colombia            | -0.04               | 62              | No             |
| Macedonia   | 0.02                | 64              | No             | Ukraine             | -0.04               | 55              | No             |
| Hungary   | 0.03                | 88              | No             | Belarus             | -0.04               | 14              | No             |
| Estonia   | 0.04                | 95              | No             | Russia              | 0.00                | 26              | No             |
| Puerto Rico   | 0.06                | 89              | No             | India               | 0.01                | 77              | Yes            |
| Latvia  | 0.07                | 84              | No             | China               | 0.03                | 17              | No             |
| Dominican   | 0.14                | 73              | No             | Peru                | 0.04                | 71              | No             |
| Japan   | 0.16                | 90              | Yes            | Romania             | 0.05                | 84              | No             |
| Spain   | 0.22                | 96              | Yes            | Singapore           | 0.07                | 51              | No             |
| Czech   | 0.25                | 94              | No             | Mexico              | 0.07                | 65              | No             |
| Uruguay   | 0.30                | 98              | No             | Poland              | 0.10                | 93              | No             |
| United States   | 0.31                | 92              | Yes            | South Korea         | 0.11                | 85              | No             |
| Argentina   | 0.32                | 80              | No             | Hong Kong           | 0.14                | 67              | No             |
| Croatia   | 0.33                | 86              | No             | South Africa        | 0.15                | 81              | No             |
| Slovenia  | 0.34                | 91              | No             | Brazil              | 0.16                | 81              | No             |
| Great Britain   | 0.38                | 97              | Yes            | Estonia             | 0.16                | 95              | No             |
| Switzerland   | 0.42                | 96              | Yes            | Cyprus              | 0.17                | 92              | No             |
| New Zealand   | 0.48                | 97              | Yes            | Taiwan              | 0.24                | 88              | No             |
| Australia   | 0.53                | 97              | Yes            | Chile               | 0.26                | 95              | No             |
| Finland   | 0.62                | 100             | Yes            | Japan               | 0.32                | 90              | Yes            |
| Germany   | 0.73                | 96              | No             | Argentina           | 0.34                | 80              | No             |
| Norway  | 0.76                | 100             | Yes            | Uruguay             | 0.38                | 98              | No             |
| Sweden  | 0.94                | 99              | Yes            | United States       | 0.44                | 92              | Yes            |
|   |                     |                 |                | Spain               | 0.47                | 96              | Yes            |
|   |                     |                 |                | New Zealand         | 0.50                | 97              | Yes            |
|   |                     |                 |                | Australia           | 0.51                | 97              | Yes            |
|   |                     |                 |                | Slovenia            | 0.57                | 91              | No             |
|   |                     |                 |                | Germany             | 0.59                | 96              | No             |
|   |                     |                 |                | Netherlands         | 0.59                | 99              | Yes            |
|   |                     |                 |                | Sweden              | 0.97                | 99              | Yes            |